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AFTER FEIST
Jessica Litman*
On March 27, 1991, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,1 upsetting a settled, if uneasy, understanding of the scope of copyright protection for databases and other compilations of fact. The Register of Copyright's remark that "the Supreme Court dropped a
bomb" 2 when it issued the Feist opinion soon became the bon mot
quoted by everyone to describe the occasion. 3 By grounding its opinion
in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,4 rather than in the copyright statute, 5 the Court appeared to foreclose the possibility that Congress could repair damage done in Feist by amending the copyright
law. Few observers, however, seem content to leave the perceived damage unrepaired. Instead, they are calling for a statutory fix based on
6
some other congressional power, most probably the Commerce Clause.
That such sui generis legislation willsoon be proposed seems unquestionable. Because a great deal of money is invested in databases
and other compilations of facts, there is sure to be great enthusiasm for
enacting some sort of copyright-like, intellectual property protection of
fact compilations. Because the database and factual compilation industries have structured themselves around the belief, well-supported by
extant case law, 7 that their works enjoyed copyright protection already,
the request for sui generis protection will be viewed as merely restoring
what Feist took away. When such a proposal is characterized as a res* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I am grateful to Robert Kreiss, Director of the
Program in Law and Technology at the University of Dayton School of Law, for inviting me to
,participate in this symposium and for accomondating my erratic schedule. I would also like to
thank Jonathan Weinberg, whose demanding editorial advice and substantive suggestions greatly
improved this paper.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
2. Copyright Office And Copyright Royalty Tribunal Report Status To House Panel, 41
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 524, (April 18, 1991).
3. E.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright: The Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 38 J. Copy.
Soc'Y 109, 118 (1991) (quoting Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
4. The Commerce Clause states that "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
.... US.CoNsT. art. 1,§ 8, cl.3.
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
6. E.g., Goldstein, supra note 3, at 119; Michael Klipper & Meredith Senter, Jr., Thick
Book, but Thin Protection, LEGAL TIMES, April 22, 1991, at 28.
7. See, e.g., National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report 42 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report]; I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.14.2, at
180-86 (1989).

Published by eCommons, 1991

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:2

toration of well-deserved and essential protection, it is tempting not to
look at such legislation as a bargain between its beneficiaries and the
members of the public. It is tempting not to ask what benefits the public will receive in return for the bargain; it is -tempting not to question
whether the public might require some insurance that the bargain will
not prove too costly. Such questions may prove to be unpopular ones.
This paper seeks to raise some of those unpopular questions, and to
offer some unpopular answers in response.
I.

Feist's IMPLICATIONS

FOR DATABASES

Feist Publicationsv. Rural Telephone Service Co.8 involved a fact
pattern typical of telephone book infringement cases. The plaintiff
phone company published a white pages directory; defendant publisher
published a competing white pages directory. When plaintiff refused to
license its listings to defendant, defendant used plaintiff's telephone
book to extract the listings that fell within the geographic area of its
directory. Defendant hired verifiers to dial the numbers thus acquired
and ask the persons who answered the phone to confirm their names,
telephone numbers, and street addresses. 9 It then published a telephone
directory containing the verified listings. The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, and the district court, following an unbroken line of
telephone directory cases, held that defendant had infringed plaintiff's
copyright by relying on the plaintiff's directory as a source for its listings without first obtaining those listings independently.' 0 In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court reversed in a sweeping opinion that denounced a century of directory copyright infringement cases as based
on a misunderstanding. 2 Surprisingly to many observers,"3 the Court
did not hold that it was not copyright infringement to use a copyrighted
phone book as a reference source for people's telephone numbers in
order to call them up and verify the information. Indeed, the Court did
not even reach the scope of copyright protection, or the nature of copyright infringement, for copyrightable compilations of fact. Instead, the

8. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
9. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. Kan.
1987), affid, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1286 (interim ed. 1991).
10. Feist, 663 F. Supp. at 219. This, of course, was functionally indistinguishable from conferring copyright protection on the factual contents of the plaintiff's directory.
11. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
12. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1291 (interim ed.
1991).
13. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: The Consequences of a Weak Connection
Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods. 52 OHIo ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1992).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/23
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Court held that white pages telephone directories were not copyrightable at all."
The implications of Feist's holding for copyright in computer
databases are indirect. The Court held the plaintiff's phonebook uncopyrightable in Feist because it failed to display the minimal creativity that the Constitution requires. 15 Unlike white pages directories,
computer databases are surely sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection. For proprietors of databases that are compilations offactual
material, however, the copyrights their databases are assuredly entitled
to may offer only illusory protection. "Notwithstanding a valid copyright," the Court noted, "a subsequent compiler remains free to use the
facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing
work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.""6 Although the structure of a computer
database's storage and retrieval mechanisms is highly creative and represents a large measure of the database's commercial value, the aggregation of individual data is in fact its most salable aspect. Under the
Supreme Court's analysis, a competitor would be1 7infringing no copyright if it simply stole the data and left the base.
If facts themselves are, as a matter of constitutional law, unprotectable under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, moreover,
Congress cannot provide meaningful protection to the data in factual
databases by amending the copyright statute. 8 There is no apparent
constitutional impediment, however, to according essentially equivalent
protection to data under the Commerce Clause. 19

II.

PROTECTING FACTS

The scholarly literature on copyright protection of collections of
facts is copious,20 and has been largely unanimous. Commentators

14. Feist, Il1 S. Ct. at 1297.
15. Id. at 1296-97.
16. Id. at 1289.
17. The analysis is the same for databases like WESTLAW and LEXIS, which compile
works of the federal government and other uncopyrightable components. Of course, a huge proportion of online services offer compilations of otherwise copyrightable material. Such services
should weather the change in the law announced by Feist unscathed.
18. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN. COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1, at 10-11 (Supp. 1991).
19. See, e.g., id. at 11; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 119. The Commerce Clause states that
"The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
several States, and with the Indian Tribes; ....
20. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation
and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1865
(1990); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy: The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Beryl R.
Jones, Copyright: Commentary - Factual Compilations and the
Soc'Y 560
Published
by(1982);
eCommons,
1991
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agree that copyright protection for factual compilations strains copyright theory intolerably." As a normative matter, however, many scholars concluded, before Feist, that factual compilations deserve copyright
protection, and that, at least in some cases, such protection should extend to the facts themselves. 2 They therefore offered a variety of suggestions for rationalizing such protection within copyright's framework,
through reconceptualization of the authorship involved in compiling
facts,2" reinterpretation of statutory language,2 ' or statutory
amendment. 5
The arguments in support of protecting the facts in factual compilations have no less force today, after Feist, than they did before the
decision. Such arguments typically focus on the need to provide incentives sufficient to inspire the creation of valuable compilations of
facts. 6 If second-comers can help themselves to arduously collected
data with impunity, nobody will invest the money and labor required to
collect the data in the first place.27 And electronic databases and other
factual compilations have tremendous value. 8 The extraordinary
growth of the online database industry over the past decade demonstrates that our society has an insatiable hunger for information, especially when it can be made available in easily accessible form. Thus, an
argument in support of intellectual property protection for facts, after
Feist, would invoke the specter of the current wealth of electronically

Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 679 (1986); Ira Lurvey, "Verifying" From Prior Directories
- "Fair Use" or Theft?, 13 BULL. Copy. Soc'y 271 (1967); William F. Patry, Copyright in
Compilations of Facts (or Why the "White Pages" Are Not Copyrightable), 12 COMM. & THE
LAw 37 (1990); David A. Shipley & Jeffery S. Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common
Law Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C. L. REv. 125 (1984); William L. Anderson,
Comment, Copyright Protection for Citations to a Law Reporter: West Publishing Co. v. Mead
Data Central, Inc., 71 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1987); Jack B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer
Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1987).
21. See, e.g., I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 2.14.2, at 180; Denicola, supra note 20, at 52730, 535-36; Anderson, supra note 20, at 1003-07.
22. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 20, at 530; Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1908-16; Jones,
supra note 19; Anderson, supra note 20, at 1019-24, Hicks, supra note 20; see also I GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, § 2.14.2.2 at 183-86 (discussing different courts' views pertaining to the proper
scope of protectible subject matter). But see Patry, supra note 20; Shipley & Hay, supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 20, at 530-31, 538.
24. See, e.g., Sarah Lum, Note, Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations - Reviving the Misappropriation Doctrine, 56 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 933, 950-52 (1988).
25. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1927-34.
26. See, e.g., id. at 1907-15; Jones, supra note 20, at 712.
27. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, § 2.14.2, at 30-31.
28. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights
in an Age of Electronics and Information 73-77, 158-69 (1986); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 INT'L L. & POL. 897 (1988);
Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Trend?, 38
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/23
CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989).
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accessible information sources dwindling as database creation ceases to
be profitable.

I have never been an aficionado of incentive arguments in favor of
broadened copyright protection. 9 They seem to me to prove too
much. 0 In the context of a burgeoning, dynamic, and immensely profitable database industry, I have little fear that Feist will result in the
industry's withering away.3 1 Intellectual property protection is, after
all, only one route to securing return on investment. Other, equally effective mechanisms beckon, and the industry, aided by the clever lawyers we all are, will surely adjust to the post-Feist world.3 2 We have the
technology to enable information providers to achieve all the protection
copyright might have supplied, and more, simply by placing conditions
on access and monitoring customer usage. Indeed, a large number of
on-line databases availed themselves of those strategies well before the
Feist decision.3 3
It is the very practicality of alternative sorts of protection that disturbs me when I imagine the world of information products after Feist.
Most of the alternative means of protecting one's investment in collections of data require tight control over access and dissemination. 4 Policing control over access and dissemination, in turn, requires significant monitoring of who is using the database and what data she is
retrieving. All of these measures cost money, and that cost is folded
into the price for database access, along with some extra amount to
compensate the owner for inevitable leakage of the system." Thus, a
world of commercial databases with no meaningful intellectual prop-

29. Jessica Litman, Essay: Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PiTT. L. REV. 235 (1991).
30. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 997-98, (1990).
31. It is worth recalling that the law before Feist was hardly monolithic. A number of
courts of appeals, most notably the Second and Ninth Circuits, had interpreted the copyright
statute to offer very little protection to factual compilations. See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow &
Richter, Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1986); Baila H. Celedonia, "Feist v. Rural
Telephone:" Is the Sky Falling for Directory Publishers?, N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1991, at 1. Notwithstanding that fact, an abundance of online database service was made available to customers
in the states of New York and California.
32. See, e.g., Celedonia, supra note 31; Klipper & Senter, supra note 6, at 28.
33. See Hearty & Polansky, ACS Chemical Journals Online: Is it Being Downloaded And
Do We Care?, in Library Of Congress Network Development and MARC Standards Office, Network Planning Paper Number 16: Intellectual Property Rights in an Electronic Age (Proceedings
of the Library of Congress Network Advisory Committee Meeting, April 22-24, 1987) at 45, 4749 (1987); The Supreme Court Eliminates Copyright Protection for White Pages and Maybe
More, 7 DATABASE SEARCHER, May, 1991, at 7.
34. The use of trade secrecy as a means of protection, for example, requires a meaningful
degree of actual secrecy. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 190-95 (1987).
Published
eCommons,
1991note 20, at 1918-22.
35. bySee
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erty protection is a world in which access to facts is expensive and
tightly controlled. It is also a world in which records are kept of the
facts that one seeks, and questions are asked about the uses to which
those facts are put.
Giving meaningful statutory protection to the individual data in
collections of data seems a reasonable price for forestalling such a
world, if it would do so. If offering proprietors a statutory incentive to
collect and disseminate data would entice them from relying on alternatives that limit public access to their works and threaten the privacy
of people who use them, it might be a sensible bargain for the public to
strike. Indeed, that argument is one of the traditional utilitarian justifications for copyright and patent legislation. 6
There is no reason to expect, however, that such a bribe would
prove effective. Such evidence as history offers indicates that the proprietors of compilations of data would, if offered meaningful federal
protection, accept it gratefully but without abandoning alternative
forms of protection that are available. While Congress was considering
whether to extend copyright protection to computer software, proponents of copyright protection argued that, without the security of copyright, authors of computer programs would conceal technical information rather than disclose it to the public.37 If proprietors of computer
programs continued to rely on trade secrecy and contract law to protect
their valuable software, it was argued, the net result would be diminished access to computer programs, wasteful duplication of research
and development, and unnecessarily expensive products." Ultimately,
of course, Congress expressly recognized that computer programs
should receive copyright protection. 9 Software manufacturers have aggressively exploited the protection that the copyright statute confers on
their works.4 0 They. have simultaneously refined and pressed their
claims to protection under the rubric of trade secrecy."1 Indeed, by

36. See, e.g., CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 17-18; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989); Eisenberg,
supra note 35, at 206.
37. See. e.g., Greg J. Nelson, The Copyrightability of Computer Programs, 7 ARIz. L. REV.
204, 218 (1966); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1274,
1297-1300 (1964).
38. See, e.g., CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 125 (summarizing contractor report); Note,
supra note 36, at 1298-99.
39. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1977 &
Supp. 1991)). See generally CONTU Report, supra note 7.
40. See generally Computers and Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1991).
41. See, e.g., Fair Use Of Unpublished Works: Hearing on Title I of H.R. 2372 Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/23
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combining copyright doctrine and trade secret doctrine, software pro-

prietors have devised a synergistic form of protection that is more than
the sum of its parts. Copyright leaves ideas, methods, and processes
unprotected.' Trade secrecy protects ideas and processes from disclosure but permits their discovery through reverse engineering.' 4 Some
software proprietors argue, however, that the combination of copyright
and trade secrecy makes reverse engineering of software to analyze its
underlying ideas, methods, and processes illegal."
It is, of course, human nature to avail oneself of any strategic advantage and attorney nature to devise clever combinations of available
strategies to achieve a competitive edge. What lawyers for software
companies have dreamed up on their clients' behalf is precisely what
clients pay attorneys for. But the example should make us less than
sanguine about the prospects of using some form of quasi-copyright
protection for facts to seduce database proprietors from relying on
other forms of protection.

III.

THE COSTS OF THE BRIBE

If the promise of bribing the proprietors of factual databases to
provide unrestricted access to their products in return for statutory protection is dubious, the cost of removing facts from the public domain is
significant. Our society has long viewed facts as basic building blocks:
building blocks of expression;"5 of self-government;' 6 and of knowledge
itself.' 7 Depriving the public at large of the unfettered use of those
building blocks could frustrate the growth of learning, impede the mar-

Judiciary, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (May 30, 1991) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2372] (statement
of William Neukom, Microsoft Corp., on behalf of the Software Publishers Ass'n); Pamela Samuelson, Reverse-Engineering Someone Else's Software: Is it Legal?, IEEE SOFTWARE, Jan. 1990,
at 90; Cary H. Sherman, Shrink-Wrap Licensing of Computer Programs, in PRACTICING LAWYER INSTITUTE, COMPUTER L. INST. 1985, at 541 (1985).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977 & Supp. 1991).
43. See, e.g., THOMAS G. FIELD, AVOIDING PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS
10 (1991); Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 193-94.
44. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2372, supra note 41 (statement of William Neukom,
Microsoft Corp., on behalf of Software Publishers Ass'n); Fair Use and Unpublished Works:
Joint Hearing on S.2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 349-53 (1991) (statement of James
M. Burger, Apple Computer, on behalf of the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers
Ass'n); Samuelson, supra note 41, at 91- 93. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1992).
45. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 30, at 1014-17.
46. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 28, at 371-72.
47. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 552 (1986); Samuelson,
Published
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ketplace of ideas, and impoverish public discourse."8 Under our current
view of things, one who encounters a fact can use that fact in any way
she chooses. She may learn the fact and absorb it into her world view,
convey the fact to others, incorporate the fact into a book, an argument, a database, or a political campaign without anyone's permission.4 9 When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea
that facts may be privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to put restrictions on the uses to which that fact may be put. That
is itself a revolutionary notion; it transforms some of the fundamental
50
premises that underlie the way we conceive of our society.
Nor is it sufficient answer that computerized databases and other
factual compilations are just one species of a plethora of information
sources available to the public, which might seek its data from other
spheres. Databases are increasing their share of the information market
with remarkable speed. The prospect that online databases will be the
research tool of choice in all industrialized societies by the end of this
decade is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Thus, the availability of
alternate sources may be a short-lived consolation. 1 More importantly,
the principle that information cannot be owned is fundamental to our
First Amendment jurisprudence and forms the foundation of our intellectual property regimes. 2 That principle facilitates access to and dissemination of information; it also has important symbolic, significance.
Thus, the price of bribing the proprietors of factual compilations with
the pledge of statutory protection for the data they disseminate may be
exorbitant. The bribe seems tolerable only if the recourse to self-help
that is already feasible seems likely to confine public access to information at least as acutely as any statutory scheme.
IV.

THE TERMS OF THE BRIBE

Whether the public will be well- or ill-served by a statutory bargain with the proprietors of factual compilations depends, of course, on
the terms of the bargain. A statutory repair of the damage Feist is
perceived to have caused could take a variety of different forms. At the
protectionist end of the spectrum, such a statute could purport to restore the law that was applied before Feist in the most expansive judi48. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 30, at 1012-23; Litman, supra note 44.
49. But see Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (conspiracy in disclosing confidential business information of the Wall Street Journal).
50. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions - knowledge, truths, ascertained, conceptions, and ideas - become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.")
51. See Litman, supra note 44.
52. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 28, at 371-75.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/23
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cial decisions5" and remove data compiled into factual compilations
from the public domain entirely. Such a statute would presumably incorporate a privilege modeled on copyright's fair use privilege5 ' which
would prove to be as unavailable to any competitive compiler as fair
use turned out to be in copyright cases.65 At the other end of the spectrum, a statute could authorize a narrow misappropriation cause of action, 6 limited to competitive dissemination of compiled data, and subject, perhaps, to a compulsory license for derivative uses. 7
Noncompetitive use of facts by compilation purchasers and database
subscribers would remain outside of the scope of the statutory remedy."' At its most bounded, such a solution could provide for only a
short period of exclusivity - measured perhaps in weeks - before the
compiled data would be subject to competitive reproduction and dissemination by others. 9
Even this most constrained of solutions, however, would diminish
the public domain by according proprietary rights in facts that had
hitherto been part of the commons.60 Thus, for the public to gain from
its bargain, it should receive something in return beyond the augmentation of profit incentives to compile and disseminate data. If the public
benefit of such a statute is its supposed enhancement of public access
to, and use of, a diversity of factual compilations, the public is entitled
to demand some assurance that its access and use would in fact be
enhanced.
Most crucially, I would argue, the public should demand that in
return for federal statutory protection of compiled data, the web of
state law doctrine that may permit legal enforcement of restrictions on
use of data be unequivocally preempted. There are, of course, compila-

53. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir.
1988); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp.
89 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
55. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 749 U.S. 1070 (1987); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp.
214 (D. Kan. 1987), ajf'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, I1l S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed.
1991).
56. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
57. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1924-36.
58. The terms competitive and noncompetitive uses are used, rather than commercial and
noncommercial uses, because a nonprofit database service operating in competition with a commercial one causes no less damage simply because it need not earn a profit. Similarly, a commercial subscriber making noncompetitive use of facts gleaned from a commercial database is behaving no less legitimately than a noncommercial subscriber engaged in the same activity. Classic
misappropriation doctrine focuses on behavior between competitors.
59. See InternationalNews, 248 U.S. 215.
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tions of fact that are used strictly internally. Compilations of facts for
solely internal consumption are used in-house rather than sold; their
owners charge no access or subscription fees.61 Proprietors of such compilations have a legitimate claim to the protection of trade secrecy, contract and breach of confidence doctrines. Except for compilations whose
use is truly so limited, however, recourse to trade secrecy and restrictive user contracts should be flatly prohibited.
If the federal statutory protection that Congress enacted were as
capacious as copyright at its most expansive, state law doctrines providing some extra measure of protection would probably be largely superfluous. Preemption of alternative remedies would, at worst, be a harmless precaution against the clever legal arguments of tomorrow. If,
however, the federal statute were to purport to strike a balance between the claims of database proprietors and the subscribers who use
them, state law alternatives might provide expedients for recalibrating
that balance at the public's expense.
V.

CONCLUSION

For me, the most crucial cost of according quasi-copyright protection to facts is the loss of the symbolic force of the axiom that facts
cannot be owned. As I weigh the advantages and disadvantages of extending statutory protection to data, I find that that price is one that I

would be unwilling to pay. I am acutely conscious, however, that my
assessment may be a minority view. And I see the practical disadvantages of such a purist's approach: retaining the symbolic advantages of
the axiom, after Feist, may well encourage tight restriction of public

access to information, and close monitoring of the uses to which that
information is put. I would argue, however, that the only legitimate
justification for conferring statutory protection on facts is ensuring that
public access to factual compilations is enhanced. Any such statute,
therefore, should not only be crafted to provide narrow remedies for
competitive injury, but should also preclude its beneficiaries from rely-

ing on more restrictive strategies for protecting their data.

61. This distinction would separate, for example, a hospital's computerized patient records
from a subscription database of medical research, or the customer mailing list that is kept confihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/23
dential from the customer mailing list that is rented to other concerns.

